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There is considerable debate over the output and employments eﬀects of
IMF-supported stabilization programs. This controversy seems especially
heated for countries facing acute balance-of-payments problems and cur-
rency crises, as witnessed in 1997 in Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and else-
where. Stiglitz (2000), for example, supports critics of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) who argue that “the IMF’s economic ‘remedies’ of-
ten make things worse—turning slowdowns into recessions and recessions
into depressions.” Some academic work also reaches this conclusion. Bordo
and Schwartz (2000), for example, conclude, “the recent spate of [IMF] res-
cues may be the case of the medicine doing more harm than good” (60).1
Similar statements by other leading economists are commonplace.
Despite these strong statements about the value of recent IMF programs,
no consensus has emerged about the impact of these programs on the real
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1. Part of the criticism against the IMF is that it contributes to moral hazard by creating the
expectation of bailouts (implicit debt guarantees) whenever countries face balance-of-
payments problems. Empirical evidence on this point is mixed. For example, Dreher and
Vaubel (2001) ﬁnd support for moral hazard associated with IMF programs, whereas Lane
and Phillips (2000) do not. See Willett (2001) for a recent review and evaluation of the litera-
ture on the debate surrounding the role of the IMF.side of the economy.2 Most empirical studies using panel data sets and re-
gression techniques ﬁnd that IMF-supported programs improve the bal-
ance of payments and current account (e.g., Khan 1990; Conway 1994;
Bordo and Schwartz 2000). This is not surprising, because a key purpose of
the IMF is “to give conﬁdence to members by making the Fund’s resources
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing
them with the opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of
payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or interna-
tional prosperity” (IMF Articles of Agreement, Article I [v]).
Views on the ultimate output and employment eﬀects of IMF programs,
however, appear much more divergent than on the balance-of-payments
eﬀects. On the surface, it may seem odd that countries would choose to par-
ticipate in an IMF stabilization program if it were not in their best interests
to do so. That is, participation in a program would presumably be unlikely
if the output costs were perceived to be particularly large, outweighing the
beneﬁts arising from improvement in the balance of payments, continued
access to credit markets, and so on. Stiglitz (2000) and others argue, how-
ever, that although oﬃcially the IMF does not force countries to participate
in programs and negotiate conditions, “[i]n practice, it undermines the
democratic process by imposing policies.”
A number of previous studies have attempted to measure the output costs
of IMF-program participation. However, these studies have reached radi-
cally diﬀerent conclusions, with results suggesting sizable declines in output
growth arising from participation in IMF programs (e.g., Przeworski and
Vreeland 2000) or quite strong positive output eﬀects (e.g., Dicks-Mireaux,
Mecagni, and Schadler 2000). These conﬂicting results arise from several
sources, including diﬀerences in the types of IMF programs that are in-
vestigated; diﬀerences in the groups of countries that are investigated
(e.g., poor developing vs. emerging-market economies); diﬀerences in the
methodologies that are employed; and, perhaps most important, how other
factors inﬂuencing output growth are taken into account.
One area that has not been suﬃciently addressed in previous work is the
role of severe currency or balance-of-payments crises on output growth and
how these events interact with subsequent participation in IMF programs.
We argue that Heckman’s (1979) inverse Mills ratio (IMR) approach does
not adequately control for selection bias in this case, because “participation
equations” in this literature (predicting whether a country participates in an
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2. There is a large literature reviewing the eﬀects of IMF-supported stabilization programs.
See, for example, Beveridge and Kelly (1980), Bird (1996), Bordo and James (2000), Connors
(1979), Conway (2000), Edwards (1989), Gylafson (1987), Killick, Malik, and Manuel (1992),
McQuillan and Montgomery (1999), Mussa and Savastano (2000), Pastor (1987), and San-
taella (1996). Bird, Hussain, and Joyce (2000) investigate the factors that cause countries to en-
ter repeatedly into IMF programs, and Joyce (2001) investigates the factors that determine the
duration of IMF programs.IMF program) generally have low explanatory power. This is partly because
two-thirds of IMF programs are not associated with severe balance-of-
payments or currency crises (discussed in section 10.4). Our approach, by
contrast, is to measure the output cost of participation in an IMF program
and investigate whether there are feedback eﬀects that make implementa-
tion of programs especially problematic in the immediate aftermath of or
concurrent with an ongoing balance-of-payments or currency crisis. Our
study focuses on three related questions: First, given that a country is al-
ready facing a severe currency crisis, does participation in an IMF-
supported stabilization program tend to make real gross domestic product
(GDP) growth weaker? Second, can one identify the channels (policy in-
struments) through which participation in IMF-supported programs aﬀect
real GDP? Third, how much of the downturn in East Asia following the
1997 currency crisis may be attributed to participation in IMF programs?
To address the ﬁrst question, we control for the eﬀect of a currency crisis
on real GDP and consider whether there is an additional eﬀect arising from
IMF-program participation at this time. We want to be sure that the eﬀect
of a currency crisis on GDP is not inadvertently attributed to participation
in an IMF program. The second question asks whether we can identify the
policy channel or policy mechanism through which IMF-program partici-
pation aﬀects real GDP growth. Beyond providing countries with access to
substantial lines of credit, IMF programs are generally associated with
conditions on the future conduct of ﬁscal, credit, and other policies. Iden-
tifying the way IMF conditionality aﬀects the formulation of policy in prac-
tice (ex post)—as opposed to the agreements themselves (ex ante)—is an
important step in determining how participation in programs might aﬀect
GDP. If the critics of the IMF are right and conditionality leads to overly
restrictive macroeconomic policies and poor output performance, then it
should show up in the data. Finally, the answer to the third question should
shed light on the macroeconomic performance of East Asian countries that
faced currency crises in 1997, distinguishing those that entered into IMF
programs (Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia) from the coun-
try that did not participate (Malaysia).
To investigate these issues we focus on short-run IMF stabilization pro-
grams (Stand-By Agreements and Extended Fund Facilities) that are ex-
plicitly focused on balance-of-payments adjustment, rather than programs
directed primarily toward structural reform and poverty reduction. The
broadest spectrum of developing and emerging-market countries possible
is considered, where the key limitation on the number of countries is the
availability of macroeconomic data. The estimation methodology em-
ployed to investigate real growth eﬀects of IMF programs is the General
Evaluation Estimator (GEE). In this context, we control for the occurrence
of recent currency or balance-of-payments crises and also test for interac-
tion eﬀects between the two events. This allows us to answer the question:
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steps in with a stabilization package? We test the basic model using a panel
data set with country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Simple reaction functions are
also estimated to characterize the inﬂuence of IMF programs on the for-
mulation of macroeconomic policy. We take into account the eﬀect of re-
cent currency crises on policy as well as the eﬀects of self-selection bias.
Section 10.2 discusses the GEE methodology and how we control for
recent occurrences of currency crises. Section 10.3 discusses the data em-
ployed in the study and our selection of IMF programs to investigate. Sec-
tion 10.4 provides a statistical background and summary statistics on the
size, frequency over time, and regional distribution of IMF programs. We
also consider the probability of a country’s adopting an IMF program
conditional upon its having had a recent currency crisis. Section 10.5
presents the primary empirical results of the study. This section presents
estimation results of the “reduced-form” output equation with explana-
tory variables that include balance-of-payments or currency crises and
IMF program participation. It also applies the model to an explanation of
the recessions faced by East Asian countries following the 1997 currency
crisis. Section 10.6 presents results from estimating policy reaction func-
tions and the eﬀect of IMF programs on credit policy. Section 10.7 con-
cludes the paper.
10.2 GEE Methodology: Controlling for Currency 
and Balance-of-Payments Crises
The basic GEE methodology employed in our study was ﬁrst applied to
the evaluation of IMF programs by Goldstein and Montiel (1986). It is
based on the idea that one can derive a counterfactual—what would have
happened to an IMF-participating country if it had not adopted a pro-
gram—by investigating the policy responses of nonparticipating countries.
The key element in this approach is that it must be possible to characterize
macroeconomic policy choices by a simple and stable (over time and across
countries) reaction function that holds for both participating and nonpar-
ticipating countries. We extend this standard model by introducing cur-
rency or balance-of-payments crisis as an additional factor inﬂuencing the
evolution of output. We also introduce an interactive term that measures
any additional adverse eﬀect on output that is associated with IMF pro-
grams directly following a currency crisis.
The growth of real GDP for the ith country at time t(yit) is explained by
policies that would have been observed in  the absence of an IMF-
supported program (Xit); exogenous external factors (W it); the recent oc-
currence of a currency or balance-of-payments crisis (DCC
i(t–1)); the existence
of an IMF-supported program (Dit
IMF); and unobservable random distur-
bances (εit).
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where X is a k-element vector of policy variables for country i at time t that
would be observed in the absence of IMF support, W is an h-element vec-
tor of exogenous variables for country i at time t, DCC
i(t–1) is a dummy variable
equal to unity if the country has recently experienced a currency crisis (and
zero otherwise), Dit
IMFis a dummy variable equal to unity if a short-run IMF
program is in eﬀect (and zero otherwise), Dit
IMF∗DCC
i(t–1) is an interaction term
measuring additional eﬀects on output growth arising from a currency cri-
sis that is immediately followed by an IMF program, and εit is a zero mean,
fixed variance, serially uncorrelated disturbance term.3  0 is a vector of
country ﬁxed eﬀects (allowing average growth rates to vary across countries
in the sample),  k is a k-element vector measuring the impact of policy
changes on output,  h is an h-element vector measuring the impact of ex-
ogenous factors on output,  CC measures the eﬀect of currency or balance-
of-payments crises on output growth,  IMF measures the aﬀect on output
from participation in an IMF-supported stabilization program, and  int
measures the eﬀect of the interaction term.
After postulating a rule for the k-element vector of policies that would
have taken place in the absence of an IMF-supported program (Xit), the
model is estimated (with ﬁxed eﬀects) using panel data drawn from coun-
tries and periods in which IMF support was in place and those in which
IMF support was absent. The aim is to get consistent estimates for  IMFand
 int—the eﬀects of IMF support on output.
Policies adopted in the absence of an IMF-supported program (Xit) are
directly observable only for nonprogram periods, and a key part of the GEE
estimation approach is therefore to construct a counterfactual for policies
during programs. This counterfactual is based upon a policy reaction func-
tion that links changes in the policy instrument to the deviation of the ob-
served lagged value for output growth from its desired value (yd
it). The pol-
icy reaction function is described by
(2)  xit    [yd
it   yi(t 1)]    it
where  it is a zero mean, ﬁxed variance, serially uncorrelated error term as-
sumed to be uncorrelated with εit, and   is the diﬀerence operator. The pa-
rameter   indicates the extent to which the policy instrument is adjusted in
response to disequilibria in the target variable. Substituting equation (2)
into equation (1) and subsuming desired output growth into the vector of
ﬁxed-eﬀect constant terms for each country ( 0) gives
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3. See Dooley (2000) and Gupta, Mishra, and Sahay (2000) for discussions of the factors
that cause output to fall following a currency crisis.(3)  yit     
0   ( k k   1)yi(t 1)    kXi(t 1)    hW it    CCDCC
i(t 1)
   IMF Dit
IMF    int(DCC
i(t 1) ∗ Dit
IMF)   εit    k it)
Equation (3) is the basic GEE reduced-form model as applied in earlier
studies (Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni, and Schadler 2000; Goldstein and Mon-
tiel 1986; and others). The usefulness of the model, as discussed in detail in
Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni, and Schadler (2000), depends on (a) whether in-
dividual country behavior may be aggregated in a stable (across countries
and time) uniform model; (b) whether it may be assumed that the policy re-
action function of a program country, had it not received IMF support, is
identical to that of nonprogram countries that did not seek support; and (c)
whether the additive term  IMF Dit
IMF and the interactive term  INT(Dit
IMF ∗
Dit
CC) can fully capture all the channels (static and dynamic) through which
participation in IMF programs may aﬀect output growth.
Unlike previous studies, we control for the (lagged) occurrence of cur-
rency and balance-of-payments crises as a predetermined variable in the
output growth equation. We also take into account the possibility that an
interactive eﬀect (operating between currency crises and the adoption of
IMF programs) may have an additional impact on output growth. Leaving
out these terms could leave the output growth equation misspeciﬁed and
lead to biased estimates.
10.3 Selection of International Monetary Fund Programs
and Data Description
10.3.1 Selection of International Monetary Fund Programs
The main IMF facilities designed to meet short-run balance-of-
payments stabilization are Stand-By Arrangements (SBA) and the Ex-
tended Fund Facility (EFF).4 In general, IMF members can access credit
tranches from the General Resources Account (GRA) either by means of
IMF program arrangements or by means of “outright purchases.” Outright
purchases are limited, typically, to the ﬁrst 25 percent of the member’s
quota and do not involve any phasing or conditionality. Stand-By Arrange-
ments have been the main instrument through which members gain access
to further credit tranches.5Stand-By Arrangements typically last for twelve
to eighteen months (the legal maximum is three years), and ﬁrst tranche
drawings do not require strict conditionality. Any drawings beyond the ﬁrst
tranche require both phasing out and stricter conditionality and are limited
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4. This discussion is based on International Monetary Fund (2000).
5. As the Articles of Agreement state, they were deﬁned as “a decision by the Fund by which
a member is assured that it will be able to make purchases from the General Resources Ac-
count in accordance with the terms of the decision during a speciﬁed period and up to a spec-
iﬁed amount” (Article XXX [b]).to 100 percent of quota annually (300 percent cumulatively together with
the EFF, as discussed below). Repurchase obligations last about three and
one-quarter to ﬁve years from the date of purchase.
The EFF, established in 1974, provides somewhat longer-term ﬁnancing
to countries in need of structural economic reforms. Extended Fund Facil-
ity arrangements typically last for three years; phasing and conditionality
are similar to the SBAs, with an emphasis on longer-term structural re-
forms. Quota limits are identical to the SBAs, whereas repurchases last
much longer (four and one-half to ten years). Both facilities are subject to
the same rate of interest for repayments.6 The supplemental reserve facility
(SRF), introduced in 1997 in the Korean stabilization program, aims to
supplement resources made available under SBAs and the EFF in order to
provide ﬁnancial assistance for exceptional balance-of-payments diﬃcul-
ties. Penalty interest rates (increasing over time) and short repayment peri-
ods (one to one and one-half years) insure that these are taken only in ex-
ceptional circumstances.7
We use the SBA and EFF programs (and, for Korea in 1997, the new SRF
program) as our deﬁnition of IMF-supported stabilization programs. These
are the only programs clearly linked to short-term balance-of-payments ad-
justment. (There are no cases of SBA and EFF programs’ being approved
in the same year in this data sample.) By contrast with these programs, some
IMF facilities are designed with other objectives in mind. We do not include
these programs, because their primary objective is not short-run balance-
of-payments stabilization and adjustment.
For example, separate from the GRA, the IMF established the structural
adjustment facility (SAF) in 1986 for “all low-income countries . . . that are
in need of such resources and face protracted balance of payments prob-
lems” (italics mine),8 and its successor, the Enhanced Structural Adjust-
ment Facility (ESAF), in 1987. In 1999, the ESAF was replaced by the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). These are managed sepa-
rately by the IMF and are ﬁnanced from the sale of IMF-owned gold to-
gether with resources provided by members in the form of loans or grants
to the IMF, as trustee, for the purpose of helping low-income member coun-
tries. These resources are used to ﬁnance highly concessional low-interest
loans. Eligible countries can withdraw up to 185 percent of their quota con-
ditional on their balance-of-payment needs and the strength of their ad-
justment program. The interest rate charged is 0.5 percent, and repayments
are over a ten-year period.
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6. Starting in 1989, the rate of charge was linked directly to the SDR interest rate, and ad-
justed weekly.
7. In our sample, the only such case is the agreement with Korea in 1997.
8. As determined by the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank’s
concessional window (the current cutoﬀ point for IDA eligibility is a 1999 per capita GDP
level of $885).By contrast with our study, Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni, and Schadler
(2000) focus on the structural adjustment programs in their research (SAF
and ESAF) and measure the eﬀects of these IMF-supported programs on
poor developing economies. Bordo and Schwartz (2000), on the other
hand, consider both IMF stabilization and structural adjustment programs
and use a mixed sample of twenty emerging-market and developed coun-
tries (including Australia and New Zealand). Similarly, Przeworski and
Vreeland (2000) do not diﬀerentiate between programs, including both sta-
bilization and structural adjustment IMF programs. However, similar to
us (and unlike Bordo and Schwartz 2000 or Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni, and
Schadler 2000), they consider a broad set of developing countries. Our ba-
sic results, however, are robust to broadening the deﬁnition of IMF pro-
grams to include the SAF and ESAF.
10.3.2 Deﬁning Currency and Balance-of-Payments Crises
Our indicator of currency and balance-of-payments crises is constructed
from “large” changes in an index of currency pressure, deﬁned as a
weighted average of monthly real exchange rate changes and monthly (per-
cent) reserve losses.9 Following convention (e.g., Kaminsky and Reinhart,
1999) the weights are inversely related to the variance of changes of each
component over the sample for each country. Our measure, taken from
Glick and Hutchison (2000, 2001), presumes that any nominal currency
changes associated with exchange rate pressure should aﬀect the purchas-
ing power of the domestic currency, that is, result in a change in the real ex-
change rate (at least in the short run). This condition excludes some large
depreciations that occur during high-inﬂation episodes, but it avoids
screening out sizable depreciation events in more moderate inﬂation peri-
ods for countries that have occasionally experienced periods of hyperinﬂa-
tion and extreme devaluation.10An episode of severe exchange rate pressure
is deﬁned as a value in the index—a threshold point—that exceeds the
mean plus two times the country-speciﬁc standard deviation, provided that
it also exceeds 5 percent.11 The ﬁrst condition insures that any large (real)
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9. Our currency pressure measure of crises does not include episodes of defense involving
sharp rises in interest rates. Data for market-determined interest rates are not available for
much of the sample period in many of the developing countries in our dataset.
10. This approach diﬀers from that of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), for example, who deal
with episodes of hyperinﬂation by separating the nominal exchange rate depreciation obser-
vations for each country according to whether inﬂation in the previous six months was greater
than 150 percent, and they calculate for each subsample separate standard deviation and mean
estimates with which to deﬁne exchange rate crisis episodes.
11. Other studies deﬁning the threshold of large changes in terms of country-speciﬁc mo-
ments include Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999); Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998); and
Esquivel and Larrain (1998). Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) use a 3–standard deviation
cutoﬀ. Although the choice of cutoﬀ point is somewhat arbitrary, Frankel and Rose (1996)
suggest that the results are not very sensitive to the precise cutoﬀ chosen in selecting crisis
episodes.depreciation is counted as a currency crisis, and the second condition at-
tempts to screen out changes that are insuﬃciently large in an economic
sense relative to the country-speciﬁc monthly change of the exchange rate.
For each country-year in our sample, we construct binary measures of
currency crises, as deﬁned above (1   crisis, 0   no crisis). A currency cri-
sis is deemed to have occurred for a given year if the currency pressure in-
dex for any month of that year satisﬁes our criteria (i.e., two standard devi-
ations above the mean as well as greater than 5 percent in magnitude). To
reduce the chances of capturing the continuation of the same currency cri-
sis episode, we impose windows on our data. In particular, after identifying
each “large” indication of currency pressure, we treat any similar threshold
point reached in the following twenty-four-month window as a part of the
same currency episode and skip the years of that change before continuing
the identiﬁcation of new crises. With this methodology, we identify 160 cur-
rency crises over the 1975–97 period.
10.3.3 Other Variables in the Output Growth Equation
and Policy Function
Estimation of the reduced-form output growth equation (3) for the out-
put growth equation necessitates that the external exogenous variables in-
fluencing output growth (vector  it) and the (lagged) policy instruments
(vector xi(t–1)) be identified. The external exogenous factors included are
(trade-weighted) external growth rates of major trading partners and the
lagged rate of real exchange rate overvaluation.12 The (lagged) policy fac-
tors considered are the change in the budget surplus to GDP ratio, inﬂation,
and credit growth.
In the policy reaction function estimates of equation (2), we also consider
regional dummy variables and a measure of policy “autocracy.”13 In con-
trolling for sample selection bias, a probit equation explaining the likeli-
hood of IMF-program participation is estimated. Other variables employed
in this estimation, not noted above, are the (lagged) ratio of foreign ex-
change reserves to imports, the change in the ratio of current account to
GDP, and real per capita GDP growth. These macroeconomic data series
are taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics CD-ROM.
The minimum data requirements to be included in our study are that GDP
data are available for a minimum of ten consecutive years over the period
1975–97. This requirement results in a sample of sixty-seven developing
Output Costs of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs 329
12. Real exchange rate overvaluation is deﬁned as deviations from a ﬁtted trend in the real
trade-weighted exchange rate. The real trade-weighted exchange rate is the trade-weighted
sum of the bilateral real exchange rates (deﬁned in terms of CPI indices) against the U.S. dol-
lar, the German mark, and the Japanese yen. The trade weights are based on the average bi-
lateral trade with the United States, the European Union, and Japan in 1980 and 1990.
13. Autocracy is an index ranging from 1 to 10, with 10 indicating the most “closed” politi-
cal system. The source of this variable is the “polity” database.countries.14 We use annual observations in our analysis. Although we em-
ploy monthly data for our (real) exchange rate pressure index to identify cur-
rency crises and date each by the year in which it occurs, using annual data
enables inclusion of a relatively large number of countries. The appendix
table provides details on the countries included in the sample, the currency
crisis dates, and the periods when countries participated in IMF programs.
10.4 Summary Statistics: International Monetary Fund Programs,
Currency Crises, and the Economy
10.4.1 International Monetary Fund Programs: 
Size, Growth, and Regional Distribution
The frequencies of the IMF programs are shown in table 10.1 (for all
countries) over the 1970–99 period. (Descriptive statistics on IMF pro-
grams reported in tables 10.1 and 10.2 cover the 1970–99 period, whereas
the other tables involving statistical analysis cover the 1975–97 period.)
The total number of programs, the average size in terms of SDRs (in paren-
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14. The developing country sample excludes major oil-exporting countries.
Table 10.1 IMF Programs in Developing Countries: Approvals by Time (1970–99)
Short-Term Programs Long-Term Programs All IMF










1985–89 115 58 173
(265.78) (87.44)
[2.2] [4.2]
1990–94 109 46 155
(275.34) (110.62)
[2.0] [5.8]
1995–99 87 63 150
(1168.48) (148.30)
[2.2] [7.0]
Totals 678 167 845
Notes: Figures are number of programs approved. Figures in parentheses are average size of
program in million SDRs. Figures in brackets are average size of program relative to GDP (%).
The size relative to GDP statistic is limited by data availability.theses), and the size of the average program as a percentage of the recipi-
ent country’s GDP (in brackets) are given in the table. The table is divided
into short-term stabilization (the focus of our study) and longer-term
structural adjustment programs, and it is also separated into ﬁve-year in-
tervals.
Over the thirty-year period, 845 IMF programs were approved, of which
678 were short-run stabilization programs—SBAs or the EFF. Only 167
were longer-term structural adjustment programs—SAF, ESAF, or the
PRGF.
The number of programs reached a peak in the early 1980s (with the
Mexican debt crisis and debt problems in other Latin American countries),
both in terms of number of programs (169) and size relative to the econ-
omies involved (average program size over 4 percent of GDP). The number
of IMF programs is not growing, nor is the size relative to the economies in-
volved (about 2 percent of GDP in 1995–99). The size of the average pro-
gram in terms of SDRs jumped in the late 1990s, however, due to the large
economic size of the countries going to the IMF for assistance (e.g., Brazil,
Indonesia, Mexico, the Russian Federation, and South Korea).15
The regional breakdown of program approvals is given in table 10.2. The
short-term stabilization programs (SBA and EFF) are primarily directed to
Latin America and Africa, with about 30 and 35 percent respectively of
program approvals. Africa dominates the long-term structural programs
(SAF or ESAF and PRGF) with 70 percent of the programs over the pe-
riod.
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Table 10.2 IMF Programs: Approvals by Region (1970–99)
SBA EFF ESAF PRGF
Totals 493 69 113 11
Latin America 146 26 13 1
(29.6) (37.7) (11.5) (9.0)
Middle East 14 6 1 0
(2.80) (8.70) (0.88) (0.00)
East and South Asia 62 12 12 1
(12.6) (17.4) (10.6) (9.0)
Africa 177 16 77 9
(35.9) (23.2) (68.1) (82.0)
Eastern Europe and the former USSR 68 8 9
(13.8) (11.6) (8.0)
Other 26 1 1 0
(5.30) (1.40) (0.88) (0.00)
Notes: Figures are number of programs approved. Figures in parentheses are percent of IMF
program by region.
15. This includes the disbursement to Korea under the SRF.10.4.2 Currency Crises and International Monetary Fund
Program Participation
An important part of our study is to investigate the link between currency
crises, real output developments, and IMF stabilization programs. Table
10.3shows the relative frequencies of currency crises and IMF stabilization
program participation for the sixty-seven countries in our sample over the
1975–1997 period. Panel A shows the contemporaneous frequencies (and
associated chi-squared independence tests), that is, contemporaneous cur-
rency crises and contemporaneous IMF program participation. Statistical
independence of these observations is rejected at the 99 percent level of con-
ﬁdence, but only 18 percent of IMF-program participation observations
are associated with currency crises. However, a substantially higher per-
centage (28 percent) of the currency crisis observations coincide with IMF-
program observations.
Panel B shows the link between IMF programs and contemporaneous
and lagged currency crises. This shows a stronger link than the contem-
poraneous relationship. Statistical independence is again rejected (at
greater than 1 percent significance). Thirty-three percent of contempora-
neous IMF-program participation observations are associated with either
a contemporaneous or previous (one-year lag) currency crisis. Similarly,
28 percent of contemporaneous or lagged currency crises are associated
with a contemporaneous IMF program. Hence, almost one-third of cur-
rency crisis observations are linked to an IMF program within the current
year or the next year. Of course, this implies that about two-thirds of the
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Short-term IMF programs associated with a contemporaneous 
currency crisis 18%
Currency crisis associated with a contemporaneous short-term 
IMF program 28%
Chi independence test for contemporaneous IMF and currency 
crisis series 0.0004
B. Contemporaneous and Lagged Frequencies
Short-term IMF programs associated with a contemporaneous 
or lagged (t – 1) currency crisis 33%
Contemporaneous or lagged (t – 1) currency crisis associated with
a short-term IMF program 28%
Chi independence test for contemporaneous IMF and currency 
crisis series 0.0000currency crisis observations are not linked with IMF-program participa-
tion.
10.4.3 Macro Developments: Participation or Nonparticipation
and Before and After Statistics
Tables  10.4–10.6 present summary statistics on the timing of IMF-
programs (SBA and EFF) participation and key macroeconomic develop-
ments. Table 10.4 shows sample mean values for macroeconomic develop-
ments during program years and nonprogram years. The ﬁrst two columns
report the statistics for all countries (both for those countries that at some
point participated in IMF programs and for those that did not), focusing
on nonprogram observations and IMF-program observations. Real GDP
growth was about 4 percent (1,082 observations) during the nonprogram
years and 2.9 percent during the program years (585 observations). This
diﬀerence is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the 99 percent level of conﬁdence (t-
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Table 10.4 Summary Statistics: Short-Term IMF Programs: Means
All Countries  IMF-Participating 
(67 Countries) Countries (60 Countries)
Nonprogram Program Nonprogram All Non-IMF Countriesa:
Variable Years Years Years Years All Years
Real GDP growth  4.18 2.94 3.62 3.36 6.83
(4.83***) (–2.62***) (1.28) (–9.10***)
[1,082] [585] [895] [1,480] [187]
Inﬂation 18.43 25.01 20.29 22.08 8.26
(–3.09***) (2.05*) (–0.99) (4.16***)
[1,061] [549] [897] [1,446] [164]
Current account– –5.09 –5.01 –5.81 –5.49 –0.01
GDP ratio (%) (–0.14) (1.28) (–0.60) (–4.33***)
[858] [473] [719] [1,192] [139]
Credit growth 25.11 26.71 26.19 26.39 18.75
(–0.77) (0.24) (–0.11) (2.28**)
[1,074] [567] [917] [1,484] [157]
Budget surplus– –3.36 –4.44 –4.04 –4.20 0.00
GDP ratio (%) (3.22***) (–1.19) (0.59) (–8.52***)
[952] [507] [796] [1,303] [156]
Notes: Figures in parentheses are statistics for difference in means with the column to the left. Figures in
brackets are number of observations.
aThe countries that have never participated in a short-term IMF program (either SBA or EFF), and that
are included in our data set, are Botswana, Hong Kong, Malta, Malaysia, Paraguay, Singapore, and
Swaziland.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.statistic equal to 4.83). Inﬂation and budget deﬁcits are signiﬁcantly higher
during the program years, but no substantive diﬀerence between program
and non-program years is detected in the growth rate of credit or the cur-
rent account balance.
There may be systematic diﬀerences in the types of countries that ap-
proach the IMF for assistance, however. Focusing only on countries partic-
ipating in IMF programs (second, third, and fourth columns) avoids this se-
lection bias. For countries involved in IMF programs (at some point during
the sample), average GDP growth was 3.6 percent during nonprogram
years and 2.9 percent during program years. This diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant. Inﬂation was also signiﬁcantly lower during the nonprogram
years. No diﬀerence is discernible in credit growth or the budget and cur-
rent account balances.
If one simply compares IMF-program countries (both during program
and nonprogram years) with those not having a program during the sample
334 Michael M. Hutchison
Table 10.5 Before and After Summary Statistics: IMF Short-Term Programs 
(four-year window: Means)
Average of 2 Years During IMF Average of 2 Years
Variable Before IMF Program Program Years After IMF Program




















Notes:Figures in parentheses are t-statistic for difference in means with the column to the left. Figures in
brackets are t-statistic for difference in means with the ﬁrst column. Figures in braces are number of ob-
servations.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.period, the diﬀerences are substantial—but not surprising. Countries that
have never participated in an IMF program during our sample period—
presumably not having had a need to participate—exhibit much stronger
economic fundamentals: much higher GDP growth rates (6.8 percent ver-
sus 3.4 percent), lower inﬂation, lower credit growth, and balanced posi-
tions in the current account and budget.
Table 10.5 focuses on the before and after time series of countries partic-
ipating in IMF programs. Four-year windows are imposed. The table shows
that output growth does not decline substantially when a country enters an
IMF program, but it does increase signiﬁcantly during the two-year period
following the program. Credit growth, by contrast, falls signiﬁcantly during
the IMF program and stays at the lower rate of growth following the pro-
gram. No statistically signiﬁcant shifts are noted in the time pattern of in-
ﬂation, the current account balance, or the budget surplus.
Table 10.6 undertakes the same decomposition as table 10.5 but instead
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Table 10.6 Before and After Summary Statistics: IMF Short-Term Programs 
(two-year window: Mean values)
1 Year Before During IMF 1 Year After
Variable IMF Program Program Years IMF Program




















Notes:Figures in parentheses are t-statistic for difference in means with the column to the left.
Figures in brackets are t-statistic for difference in means with the ﬁrst column. Figures in
braces are number of observations.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.imposes only a two-year window, together with a one-year interval before
and after IMF program participation. Real GDP growth is not much diﬀer-
ent one year before and during an IMF program, but it rebounds substan-
tially the year following a program. Inﬂation drops before, during, and af-
ter programs, but the variation in the sample is so great that the diﬀerences
are not statistically signiﬁcant. Credit growth drops sharply following an
IMF program and stays lower one year following a program. The budget
balance improves during an IMF program and stays at a lower level follow-
ing the program.
Tables 10.5 and 10.6 clearly demonstrate that economies typically expe-
rience slow growth prior to entering into an IMF program, and sluggish
growth continues until the program is concluded. It does not appear that
participation in the IMF program directly contributed to slower growth. In-
ﬂation and credit growth both declined during the IMF-program period
and stayed lower than in the preprogram period. In short, these summary
statistics paint a classic recession-rebound pattern, but it is not clear if IMF
program participation played a role.
10.5 Real Output Eﬀects of International Monetary Fund Programs
10.5.1 General Evaluation Estimator Estimates
The reduced-form GEE estimates (equation [3]) are reported in table
10.7. White’s consistent standard errors are reported. The ﬁrst column re-
ports the model without controlling for country ﬁxed eﬀects or currency
crises. The lagged control variables are the change in the budget surplus ra-
tio, inﬂation, credit growth, external (world) output growth, and real ex-
change rate overvaluation. A lagged dependent variable, as suggested in the
theoretical formulation of the model, is also included. The focus is the co-
eﬃcient on the IMF-program dummy. The coeﬃcient estimate is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant (99 percent level of conﬁdence) and indicates that real
GDP growth is lowered by about 1 percent during each year of IMF-
program participation.
The estimated coeﬃcients on lagged external growth (positive) and
lagged real exchange rate overvaluation (negative) have the predicted signs
and are statistically signiﬁcant. In terms of the policy variables, the esti-
mated coeﬃcient on the lagged change in the budget surplus is positive, and
the estimated coeﬃcient on lagged credit growth is negative. Both are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. Interpreting these coeﬃcients in terms of reaction
functions, the rise in the lagged budget surplus (rise in credit growth) could
lead to a more expansionary (restrictive) contemporaneous ﬁscal policy
(credit policy) and hence a rise (fall) in output growth. Other interpretations
are possible. For example, countries with more sustainable ﬁscal policies
and lower credit growth may have systemically higher real output growth
336 Michael M. Hutchisonrates. Inclusion of ﬁscal and credit variables may be picking up important
cross-country diﬀerences in economic performance.
Column (2) reports results for the model with country ﬁxed eﬀects
(dummy variables for each country to capture the signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
growth rates over the full sample period) and the currency crisis variable.
These variables are highly statistically signiﬁcant, increasing the overall ex-
planatory power of the model (R-squared) from 12 percent to 21 percent. A
currency crisis in year t – 1 is associated with a decline in output growth in
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Table 10.7 Output Growth Equation Estimates (Dependent variable: real GDP growth rate)
Coefﬁcient
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 3.787*** 4.169*** 4.164*** 4.444*** 4.147***
(8.02) (7.52) (7.37) (7.70) (7.43)
Change in budget surplus–GDP  13.607*** 7.412* 7.213* 7.266* 7.254*
ratio (t – 1) (3.31) (1.89) (1.81) (1.82) (1.81)
Inﬂation (t – 1) –0.005 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
(–0.82) (0.56) (0.55) (0.46) (0.61)
Credit growth (t – 1) –0.009 –0.009** –0.009** –0.009** –0.010**
(–1.55) (–2.14) (–2.08) (–2.03) (–2.13)
Real GDP growth (t – 1) 0.094 0.139** 0.146** 0.150** 0.148**
(1.34) (2.25) (2.31) (2.39) (2.32)
External growth rates (t) 0.275*** 0.253*** 0.255*** 0.268*** 0.259***
(weighted average) (3.17) (2.69) (2.71) (2.82) (2.75)
Real exchange rate  –0.030*** –0.033*** –0.030*** –0.030*** –0.030***
overvaluation (t – 1) (–4.37) (–4.19) (–3.66) (–3.61) (–3.49)
IMF participation dummy  –1.010*** –0.740* –0.781** –0.659 –0.749*
for short-term programs (t)( –3.37) (–1.87) (–2.02) (–1.44) (–1.82)
Currency crises dummy (t – 1) –1.496*** –1.161*** –1.107** –1.089**
(–3.32) (–2.80) (–2.39) (–2.34)





i; t, or (t–1) (–0.30) (–0.32)
Dynamics for IMF participation 
dummy for Short-term  –0.457
programsa (t – 1, t – 2, t – 3) (0.10)
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.22
N 1,128 966 958 958 958
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.61 2.00 1.99 1.98 1.98
Note: All regressions, except the ﬁrst, include country dummies. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
aSum of the coefﬁcients of the IMF dummy lagged for t – 1, t – 2, and t – 3 (t-statistic on sum of lags re-
ported). F-statistic (joint signiﬁcance of three lagged values) is 0.86.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.year t of about 1.5 percentage points. The coeﬃcient estimate on the IMF-
participation variable decreases substantially when the currency crisis vari-
able is taken into account, indicating that output growth is about 0.74 per-
centage points less annually for each year of IMF-program participation.
This coeﬃcient estimate, however, is only signiﬁcant at the 90 percent level
of conﬁdence.
Column (3) reports the results of the model when both contemporaneous
and lagged currency crisis variables are included in the regression. Both of
the currency crisis variables are negative and statistically signiﬁcant. The
coeﬃcient estimate on the IMF-program participation is similar (0.78) to
the result reported in column (2).
Column (4) reports the results where the model includes an interactive
term measuring the occurrence of an IMF program that takes place around
the time of a recent occurrence of a currency crisis (i.e., contemporaneous
or in the previous year). The model estimates again suggest that a currency
crisis leads to an output loss, but the coeﬃcient estimate (–0.66) on the
IMF-program dummy variable is not statistically signiﬁcant. Is the output
loss associated with a currency crisis magniﬁed if an IMF program is ap-
proved in the same year or immediately following a severe balance-of-
payments or currency crisis? The interaction term in column (4) is not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, indicating that the output loss associated with a crisis
does not appear to be aﬀected by a country’s participation in an IMF pro-
gram.
Column (5) reports results from estimating a more dynamic speciﬁcation
of the model. The objective is to investigate whether the adverse eﬀects from
participating in an IMF program dissipate, or perhaps intensify, over time.
This is accomplished by including three lags of the IMF-participation vari-
able. It appears that the adverse output eﬀects are felt during the years of
IMF program participation (generally one to three years), but no signiﬁ-
cant additional eﬀects are observed in subsequent years. That is, neither the
sum of the coeﬃcients on the three lagged values of program participation
nor the joint test is statistically diﬀerent from zero (see footnote a to table
10.7).
In sum, the results are robust and indicate that participating in an IMF
program, regardless of whether a currency or balance-of-payments crisis
has recently occurred, “costs” about 0.6–0.8 percentage points of real GDP
growth annually. Our estimates are about half the size of the negative im-
pact reported by Przeworski and Vreeland (2000)16 or Bordo and Schwartz
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16. Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) estimate a long-run growth model (using capital and la-
bor growth as independent variables), dividing the sample into (IMF) program observations
and nonprogram observations. They also include the IMR in the regression. Their conclusions
regarding the growth eﬀects of IMF-program participation are based on the diﬀerence be-
tween the estimated constant terms in the two regressions.(2000),17 and similar in magnitude to Conway (1994). Unlike Conway
(1994), however, we do not ﬁnd that the reduction in growth is followed by
higher future output growth.18
It is noteworthy that we also tested for sample selection bias in the esti-
mation procedure, and the results were unaﬀected. The estimates on the
IMF and currency-crisis variables did not change, and the coeﬃcient on
IMF was not statistically signiﬁcant. (The probit equation estimated to mea-
sure self-selection bias is presented in table 10A.3.) Of course, insigniﬁcance
of the IMR variable may be either because selection bias is not an important
issue or because the participation equation is misspeciﬁed. These results are
not reported for brevity but are available from the author upon request. This
ﬁnding is similar to Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni, and Schadler (2000). (We do
ﬁnd IMR signiﬁcant in the policy reaction functions, however.)
10.5.2 Extensions: IMF Program Dating and 
Downturns Prior to IMF Program Approvals
Table 10.8 presents several extensions of the basic output growth model.
The ﬁrst two columns use the conventional dating scheme employed in table
10.7, dating the IMF program in the calendar year in which it was approved.
The ﬁrst column adds a one-year leading indicator of IMF program partic-
ipation (“lead IMF program participation dummy, t   1”) and the second
column adds a one-year leading indicator of IMF program approval (only
the year of approval; subsequent program years are coded as zero). The de-
scriptive evidence presented in table 10.6 suggests that a downturn in out-
put tends to lead (by one year) participation in an IMF program. A lagged
dependent variable included in the basic output growth equation helps to
account for this dynamic. If cycles are irregular, however, inclusion of the
IMF leading variable might be able to better capture downward shifts in
output growth occurring with some regularity prior to IMF program par-
ticipation. The leading IMF dummy variable is not signiﬁcant in either col-
umn (1) or (2), however, and the contemporaneous eﬀects are quite similar
to those reported in table 10.7.
The second two columns use an alternative-dating scheme for the imple-
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17. Bordo and Schwartz (2000) report a contemporaneous eﬀect of IMF programs of 
–1.61 (t   0.97) and a one-year lagged eﬀect of 2.24 (t   2.67). The contemporaneous eﬀect
is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and the one-year lagged eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 99 per-
cent level of confidence. On balance, their results indicate that IMF-program participation
has a net positive eﬀect on growth. Surprisingly, they conclude that “The main detriment
[of IMF-program participation] is a temporary reduction in real growth” (57) and “the
impression given by the annual data . . . that turning to the IMF may be harmful to a coun-
try’s real economic performance” (60). Our results are not directly comparable, however, be-
cause they have a limited sample of emerging-market and developed countries and include
short-run stabilization programs, structural adjustment, and poverty reduction programs in
their study.
18. Similar to us, Conway (1994) uses only SBA and EFF programs in his study.340 Michael M. Hutchison
Table 10.8 Output Growth Equation: Extensions (Dependent variable: real GDP growth rate)
Coefﬁcient
Variable Standard Dating Alternative Dating
Constant 4.171*** 4.068*** 4.159*** 4.032***
(7.36) (7.29) (7.48) (7.26)
Change in budget surplus–GDP  7.080* 6.912* 7.042* 6.635*
ratio (t – 1) (1.77) (1.71) (1.78) (1.64)
Inﬂation (t – 1) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.56) (0.54) (0.57) (0.56)
Credit growth (t – 1) –0.009** –0.009** –0.009** –0.009**
(–2.11) (–2.12) (–2.10) (–2.12)
Real GDP growth (t – 1) 0.146** 0.150** 0.147** 0.152**
(2.33) (2.41) (2.36) (2.42)
External growth rates (t) 0.253*** 0.264*** 0.252*** 0.267***
(weighted average) (2.69) (2.81) (2.72) (2.85)
Real exchange rate overvaluation (t – 1) –0.030*** –0.029*** –0.030*** –0.029***
(–3.62) (–3.42) (–3.53) (–3.44)
IMF program participation dummy (t)– 0.647* –1.217**
(–1.77) (–2.71)
Lead IMF program participation  –0.266 0.303
dummy (t + 1) (–0.69) (0.73)
IMF program approval dummy (t)– 0.878* –0.583
(–1.93) (–1.51)
Lead IMF program approval  –0.550 0.305
dummy (t + 1) (–1.42) (0.74)
Currency crises dummy (t – 1) –1.137*** –1.178*** –1.110*** –1.228***
(–2.72) (–2.86) (–2.67) (–2.98)
Currency crises dummy (t)– 0.778* –0.643 –0.772* –0.783*
(–1.84) (–1.52) (–1.83) (–1.83)
Adjusted R2  0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22
N 958 958 958 958
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.99 2.00 1.99 2.00
Note: All regressions include country dummies. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
mentation of IMF programs that has been used by Dicks-Mireaux,
Mecagni, and Schadler (2000) and others. This dating scheme dates the
IMF program to be in eﬀect in year t if it was approved in the ﬁrst half of
year t or in the second half of year t – 1. Again the leading IMF-program
dummy variable is not statistically signiﬁcant. However, the estimated con-
temporaneous eﬀects of IMF programs on output growth using the alter-
native dating scheme do change somewhat. In particular, the estimated neg-
ative eﬀect of an IMF program in column (3) (IMF program participation)
rises to –1.22 and is signiﬁcant at the 95 percent level of conﬁdence. By con-
trast, the estimated output eﬀect in the year of an IMF program approval isinsigniﬁcant. These results indicate that changes in the dating scheme of
IMF program implementation and program deﬁnition (whether deﬁned as
all years of participation or only the ﬁrst year of approval) aﬀect the results
to some extent but do not change the basic ﬁndings.
We also estimated the basic model over the 1990–97 period, because the
evolving nature of IMF programs and conditionality may have changed
their eﬀect on output. In particular, the number of conditions attached to
IMF programs have increased in the 1990s. The coeﬃcient on the IMF
dummy drops to only –0.36 in this regression and is not signiﬁcant at con-
ventional levels.
10.5.3 The East Asian Financial Crisis and Output Contraction
Figure 10.1 presents the predicted values for output growth for the ﬁve
East Asian countries that experienced a severe currency and balance-of-
payments crisis in 1997. These predictions are for 1998 and based on 1997
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B
Fig. 10.1 Real GDP growth in East Asia 1998 (predicted values and forecast error):
A, Indonesia; B, Korea; C, Malaysia; D, The Philippines; E, Thailand
Avalues of the explanatory variables, and the coeﬃcient estimates—includ-
ing country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects—are based on the model presented in col-
umn (3) of table 10.7 (estimates are based on 1975–97 data). The explana-
tory factors leading to the 1998 predicted value are decomposed into (a)
domestic factors (change in budget surplus, inﬂation, and credit growth);
(b) external factors (external growth and real exchange rate overvaluation);
(c) other factors (previous year’s output growth and country-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀect); (d) the currency crisis eﬀect; and (e) the IMF-participation eﬀect.
Predicted output growth for all ﬁve countries is positive in 1998, and the




Fig. 10.1 (cont.) Real GDP growth in East Asia 1998 (predicted values and fore-
cast error): A, Indonesia; B, Korea; C, Malaysia; D, The Philippines; E, Thailandforecast error (unexpected declines in output) is therefore very large. The
negative eﬀect exerted by the currency crisis and subsequent participation
in an IMF program is entirely dominated by positive “other factors”—
mainly a history of very strong growth in the region and the consequently
large country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect growth factor—and a modestly support-
ive external growth environment. The eﬀect of the currency crisis was ex-
pected to slow output growth by 1–2 percentage points, and IMF-program
participation (for Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, and the Philippines) lowers
predicted growth by about 0.8 percentage points.
The largest unexpected fall in real GDP was Indonesia (17.6 percentage
points) and the least in the Philippines (3 percentage points). The average
of the four negative forecast errors for the four countries participating in
IMF programs was 12.3 percentage points, not much diﬀerent from the
13.5 point unexpected fall in Malaysia’s GDP. Not participating in the IMF
program did not appear to help Malaysia avoid a huge fall in output, and
this decline was similar to others in the region.19 The 0.8 predicted negative
eﬀect of participating in an IMF program pales by comparison with the ac-
tual declines in output observed.
There appears to have been a common shock or common vulnerability in
these countries—not related to the IMF and unobserved in this model—
causing the unexpectedly large collapse in output.20 All of these countries
had serious banking problems that were associated with currency crises, a
characteristic likely to cause substantially greater output eﬀects, working
through the disruption of credit and other channels (Glick and Hutchison
2001). Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore avoided the worst of the cur-
rency and banking problems because they did not have signiﬁcant external
(foreign-currency-denominated) short-term debt positions. Other factors,
such as an abrupt loss of conﬁdence after two decades of rapid growth and
unrealistically high expectations for the region, may also have played a role.
10.6 Is Policy Changed by International Monetary Fund–
Program Participation?
An important assumption underlying the GEE strategy is that it is pos-
sible to characterize policy actions in the form of stable and systematic re-
Output Costs of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs 343
19. Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) argue that, following the crisis, the imposition of capital con-
trols in Malaysia, as opposed to adoption of an IMF program, led to a faster recovery and
lower unemployment compared to Thailand and South Korea. They compare the aftermath
of the imposition of controls in 1998 with the adoption of IMF programs in 1997 by Korea and
Thailand (using the time-shifted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcation). However, this ap-
proach does not take into account a counterfactual that the Malaysian currency crisis prob-
ably would not have extended to September 1998 if it had adopted an IMF program in 1997.
20. It is possible that the “common shock” was indeed especially severe austerity programs
associated with the IMF programs and perhaps mimicked by Malaysia to gain international
acceptance of its policies. However, the evidence reported by Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) and
others, and the imposition of capital controls by Malaysia, does not support this view.action functions (equation [2]). This may prove extremely diﬃcult because
we are attempting to identify common responses from a broad spectrum
of developing and emerging-market countries over a thirty-year period.
The work of Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni, and Schadler (2000) highlights the
problems in identifying a consistent policy reaction function even among
low-income developing economies. For example, they do not ﬁnd any sig-
niﬁcant determinants of the ﬁscal balance or net domestic credit. They
conclude that “these estimates provide a weak basis for deriving estimates
of the unobservable counterfactuals” (508).
Table 10.9 presents our estimates of policy reaction functions for do-
mestic credit growth—a primary policy instrument for many developing
economies. Domestic credit growth is also a key indicator of monetary pol-
icy used by the IMF in conditionality and surveillance. Equations for nar-
row money growth, broad money growth, and government budget policy-
reaction functions were also estimated, but the results are much weaker and
not reported for brevity.
Column (1) reports the results of the basic policy-reaction-function
model for all observations in the sample (program and nonprogram years),
and columns (2) and (3) report the estimates over the program and nonpro-
gram observations, respectively. Consistent with the theoretical formula-
tion of the model, the macroeconomic determinants consist of lagged val-
ues of the current account surplus (relative to GDP), inﬂation, real GDP
growth, and whether the country experienced a currency crisis. Also in-
cluded are regional dummy variables and a dummy variable for the form of
government (“autocracy”). Further, in the equations for nonprogram years
and program years we have included the IMR to control for sample selec-
tion bias. (The probit model estimated with IMF-program approvals as the
dependent variable is reported in table 10A.3. The IMR is calculated from
the predicted values of this model.)
The only signiﬁcant macroeconomic predictors of credit growth, shown
in columns (1)–(3), are lagged inﬂation and the occurrence of a currency cri-
sis in the previous year. The coeﬃcient estimates of lagged inﬂation range
between 0.6 and 0.7, indicating that a 1 percentage point rise in inﬂation is
associated with a rise (fall) in nominal credit growth (real credit growth) of
about 0.7 (0.3) percentage points. Interpreting this equation as a reaction
function suggests that, in response to a rise in inﬂation, the authorities re-
spond by reducing real credit growth. The coeﬃcient on the (lagged) cur-
rency crisis variable is positive and signiﬁcant in columns (1) and (3), indi-
cating that countries generally respond to currency crises by expanding
credit growth.
The constant term is much lower during IMF programs (6.9) relative to
the nonprogram observations (28.8), suggesting more restrictive policy on
average during the IMF-program years. The IMR is signiﬁcant in the IMF-
program-years regression (column [3]), indicating that sample selection
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Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 10.252*** 6.892 28.769*** 40.045*** 39.857***
(4.23) (1.39) (4.46) (4.55) (4.67)
Change in current account– –11.720 48.131 –67.246** –19.938 –18.511
GDP ratio (t – 1) (–0.49) (0.87) (–2.05) (–0.89) (–0.83)
Inﬂation (t – 1) 0.615*** 0.641*** 0.661*** 0.390*** 0.394***
(4.97) (3.06) (4.24) (2.86) (2.95)
Real GDP growth (t – 1) 0.063 0.024 –0.385 –0.267 –0.277
(0.22) (0.09) (–0.78) (–1.08) (–1.13)
Autocracy –0.337 –0.022 –0.511 0.409 0.509*
(–1.17) (–0.06) (–1.11) (1.32) (1.64)
Africa dummy –0.520 –0.544 –6.897 –33.074*** –35.168***
(–0.19) (–0.15) (–1.47) (–4.03) (–4.33)
Asia dummy 3.328** 4.411 0.163 –23.709*** –24.277***
(2.00) (1.51) (0.08) (–2.82) (–2.97)
Latin America dummy 4.558** 6.738* 5.228* –25.626*** –25.463***
(2.24) (1.73) (1.77) (–3.30) (–3.36)
Inverse Mills ratio  1.373 49.661***
(sample selection correction) (0.75) (3.40)
IMF participation dummy (t)– 3.942* –1.285
(–1.84) (–0.67)
Currency crises dummy (t – 1) 3.737 –3.315 19.210*** 3.798 11.326**





Adjusted R2 0.38 0.47 0.41 0.44 0.44
N 987 322 505 987 987
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.73 1.27 1.92 1.81 1.83
Note: Column (4) and (5) regressions also include country dummies. Numbers in parentheses are 
t-statistics.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
All Years
bias is an issue: countries do not randomly enter into IMF programs, and
their decision to participate is systematically linked to domestic credit
growth.
The regressions reported in columns (4) and (5) cover all years and con-
trol for IMF-program participation by including a dummy variable in the
regression. Country-speciﬁc dummy variables are included in these regres-
sions—a ﬁxed-eﬀects model formulation—in order to control for the wide
variation in average credit growth across countries. These results indicate
the importance of controlling for country ﬁxed eﬀects in attempting to ex-plain credit growth over such a wide diversity of countries. The impact of
inﬂation is substantially reduced (to 0.4), indicating that inﬂation reduces
real credit growth. The dummy variable on autocracy is also signiﬁcant in
one formulation of the model, as are the regional dummy variables.
We  ﬁnd that, in column (4), IMF programs reduce domestic credit
growth by about 4 percentage points during the period they are in eﬀect. In-
clusion of the interactive term, in column (5), indicates that currency crises
tend to induce greater credit expansion (by 11 percentage points), and the
joint coincidence of a recent currency crisis and current IMF program is as-
sociated with a contraction of credit by about 15 percent annually. The joint
eﬀect of a currency crisis (lagged) followed by an IMF program is estimated
to reduce credit growth by about 5.6 percentage points (11.2–1.3–15.6).
These results suggest that IMF-program participation is associated with
restrictive credit growth. Investigations of budget policy and money
growth, however, did not indicate any link between IMF-program partici-
pation and policy. Even the credit reaction function is fairly weak, however,
likely reﬂecting shifts in policy over time and the fact that the types of coun-
tries going to the IMF for assistance have very diﬀerent characteristics from
countries not going to the IMF.
10.6.1 The East Asian Financial Crisis and Credit Growth
The empirical credit growth equation (column [4] of table 10.9) is em-
ployed to predict credit growth for the ﬁve East Asian countries that expe-
rienced currency crises in 1997. Predicted credit growth was divided into
component parts and the “unexpected” (forecast error) calculated. In every
case, credit growth in 1998 is predicted to be quite strong, ranging from 15.5
(the Philippines) to 24.4 (Indonesia). Participation in IMF programs low-
ered predicted credit growth by about 4 percentage points, and the pre-
dicted response to the currency crises increased predicted credit growth by
about 4 percentage points.21
A sharp and unanticipated contraction (negative forecast error) was ex-
perienced in every country except for Indonesia following the East Asian
currency crisis. The countries that participated in IMF programs experi-
enced smaller unexpected declines (Korea, –8.4 percent; the Philippines, –
17.5 percent; Thailand, –18.2 percent) than did Malaysia (–23.2), and In-
donesia experienced a sharp, unpredicted jump in credit. The observed de-
cline, as opposed to the negative forecast error, in credit growth was also
largest in Malaysia at –2.7 percent. Indonesia, by contrast, experienced an
18.6 percent unpredicted rise in credit and an observed rise of 43 percent.
Similar to the output growth prediction results, Malaysia was hurt at least
as much by the Asian currency crisis as the IMF-program countries.
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21. These results are not reported for brevity but are available from the author upon request.10.7 Conclusion
The estimated cost of an IMF stabilization program, in terms of forgone
output growth, is about 0.6–0.8 percentage points during each year of pro-
gram participation. Currency crises also reduce output growth over a two-
year period by about 2 percentage points. Participation in an IMF-
supported program following a balance-of-payments or currency crisis,
however, does not appear to mitigate or exacerbate the output loss. This is
despite the fact that countries participating in IMF programs seem to fol-
low much tighter credit policy when facing a severe balance-of-payments
crisis. Moreover, there is some evidence that the decline in GDP growth gen-
erally precedes the approval of an IMF program and may not be attributa-
ble to program participation per se. These results are robust to estimation
technique, model speciﬁcation, types of IMF programs included, and cor-
rections for sample selection bias.
The huge declines in output and credit growth in the wake of the 1997
Asian currency crisis were much larger than predicted by historical patterns
linking GDP developments to currency crises, IMF program participation,
external conditions, and policy developments. Indeed, the models predicted
fairly robust output growth and credit growth in 1998 despite the currency
crises and, in most cases, participation in IMF-supported programs. The
unexpected falls in output and credit were also very large in Malaysia, even
though it chose not to participate in an IMF stabilization program at the
time. Whether a country decided to participate in an IMF-supported pro-
gram at the time of the Asian currency crisis seems to have had little aﬀect
on the ultimate output cost.
The eﬀect of IMF-supported stabilization programs on output growth—
judging by the experiences of sixty-seven countries with over 450 pro-
grams—does not appear large in comparison with the average growth rates
of developing and emerging-market economies over the 1975–97 period.
Nonetheless, whether the cost of participating in an IMF-supported stabi-
lization program exceeds the beneﬁt measured in terms of balance-of-
payments adjustment and continued access to credit markets is an open
question to be answered by policy makers in the countries involved.
Appendix
Participation in IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs
Table 10A.3 presents a probit equation attempting to explain participation
in short-term IMF programs by a variety of economic determinants. Our
selection of economic determinants is guided by previous literature in this
Output Costs of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs 347area, especially Knight and Santaella (1997), who test a number of supply-
side (e.g., willingness of the IMF to approve programs) and demand-side
(e.g., demand of a particular country for IMF credits) determinants. This
literature demonstrates that entering into an IMF agreement is not ran-
dom, but guided by “a clear set of observable economic factors that are
strongly correlated with the event of approval of a ﬁnancial arrangement”
(431). They ﬁnd that a low level of international reserves, low per capita
GDP, high ratio of external debt service (to export earnings), movements in
the real exchange rate, weak GDP growth, and a low rate of domestic in-
vestment induce countries to seek an IMF-supported program. Policy mea-
sures to enhance ﬁscal revenues, reduce government expenditures, tighten
domestic credit, and adjust the exchange rate are signiﬁcant factors likely to
win IMF approval of programs.
We report similar results in table 10A.3. We ﬁnd that an improvement
in the budget surplus helps win IMF approval of programs, whereas lower
foreign exchange reserves (relative to imports) and a currency crisis in-
duce countries to seek an IMF program. Countries in Africa and Asia are
less likely to have short-term IMF programs approved. There is no discern-
ible shift in the probability of having an IMF program approved in the
1980s and 1990s compared to earlier periods and, surprisingly, we ﬁnd no
connection between program approval and inﬂation, real exchange rates,
real per capita GDP growth, or the level of real GDP per capita. Other
lagged values were investigated but did not add explanatory power to the
model.
There are 862 observations in sample, and the model (at the 25 percent
predicted probability cutoﬀ point) predicts 71 percent of the observations
correctly. However, although 80 percent of the “no program participation”
observations are correctly predicted, only 34 percent of the “program ap-
proval” observations are correctly predicted. At the 10 percent probability
cutoﬀ point, however, 96 percent of the “program participation” observa-
tions are correctly predicted, but only 32 percent of the “no participation”
observations.
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Table 10A.2 Occurrences of Currency Crises and IMF Program Participation
Currency Crises IMF Programs
Argentina 1975, 1982, 1989 1972f, 1973f, 1975f, 1976a, 1976f, 1977a, 1983a, 
1984a, 1987a, 1989a, 1991a, 1992b, 1996a
Bolivia 1981, 1983, 1988, 1991 1973a, 1980a, 1986a, 1986c, 1988c, 1994c
Brazil 1982, 1987, 1990, 1995 1970a, 1971a, 1972a, 1983b, 1988a, 1992a
Chile 1985 1970a, 1972f, 1973f, 1974a, 1975a, 1985b, 1989a
Colombia 1985 1970a, 1971a, 1972a, 1973a
Costa Rica 1981 1976a, 1980a, 1981b, 1982a, 1985a, 1987a, 1989a, 
1991a, 1993a, 1995a
Dominican Republic 1985, 1987, 1990 1983b, 1985a, 1991a, 1993a
Ecuador 1982, 1985, 1988 1970a, 1972a, 1983a, 1985a, 1986a, 1988a, 1989a, 
1991a, 1994a
El Salvador 1986, 1990 1970a, 1972a, 1980a, 1982a, 1990a, 1992a, 1993a, 
1995a, 1997a
Guatemala 1986, 1989 1970a, 1972a, 1981a, 1983a, 1988a, 1992a
Haiti 1977, 1991 1970a, 1971a, 1972a, 1973a, 1974a, 1975a, 1976a, 
1977a, 1978b, 1982a, 1983a, 1986c, 1989a, 
1995a, 1996d
(continued)Table 10A.2 (continued)
Currency Crises IMF Programs
Honduras 1990 1971a, 1972a, 1979b, 1982a, 1990a, 1992c
Mexico 1976, 1982, 1985, 1994 1977b, 1983b, 1986a, 1989b, 1995a
Nicaragua 1993 1970a, 1972a, 1979a, 1991a, 1994c
Panama 1970a, 1971a, 1972a, 1973a, 1974a, 1975a, 1977a, 
1978a, 1979a, 1980a, 1982a, 1983a, 1985a, 
1992a, 1995a, 1997b
Paraguay 1984, 1986, 1988, 1992
Peru 1976, 1979, 1987 1970a, 1977a, 1978a, 1979a, 1982b, 1984a, 1993b, 
1996b
Uruguay 1982 1970a, 1972a, 1972f, 1975a, 1976a, 1976f, 1977a, 
1979a, 1980a, 1981a, 1983a, 1985a, 1990a, 
1992a, 1996a, 1997a
Venezuela 1984, 1986, 1989, 1994 1989b, 1996a
Grenada 1978 1975a, 1979a, 1981a, 1983b
Guyana 1987, 1989 1970a, 1971a, 1972a, 1973a, 1974a, 1974f, 1975a, 
1976a, 1978a, 1979b, 1980b, 1990a, 1990c, 
1994c
Belize 1984a
Jamaica 1978, 1983, 1990 1973a, 1974f, 1977a, 1978b, 1979b, 1981b, 1984a, 
1987a, 1988a, 1990a, 1991a, 1992b
Trinidad & Tobago 1985, 1988, 1993 1989a, 1990a
Cyprus 1980a
Jordan 1983, 1987, 1989, 1992 1972f, 1973f, 1989a, 1992a, 1994b, 1996b
Syria 1977, 1982, 1988 1972f
Egypt 1979, 1989 1973f, 1977a, 1978b, 1987a, 1991a, 1993b, 1996a
Bangladesh 1975 1972f, 1974a, 1975a, 1979a, 1980b, 1983a, 1987c, 
1990c
Myanmar 1975, 1977 1973a, 1974af, 1977a, 1978a, 1981a
Sri Lanka 1977 1971a, 1972f, 1973f, 1974af, 1977a, 1979b, 1983a, 
1991c
Hong Kong
India 1976, 1991, 1995 1974f, 1981b, 1991a
Indonesia 1978, 1983, 1986, 1997 1970a, 1971a, 1972a, 1973a, 1997a
Korea 1980, 1997 1970a, 1971a, 1972a, 1973a, 1974a, 1975a, 1977, 
1980a, 1981a, 1983a, 1985a, 1997a, 1997e
Laos 1995 1975f, 1980a, 1989c, 1993c
Malaysia 1986, 1997
Nepal 1975, 1981, 1984, 1991,  1975a, 1985a, 1987c, 1992c
1995
Pakistan 1972a, 1973a, 1974a, 1980b, 1981b, 1988ac, 1993a, 
1994bc, 1995a, 1997bd
The Philippines 1983, 1986, 1997 1970a, 1971a, 1972a, 1973af, 1974a, 1975a, 1976f, 
1979a, 1980a, 1983a, 1984a, 1986a, 1989b, 
1991a, 1994b
Singapore 1975
Thailand 1981, 1984, 1997 1978a, 1981a, 1982a, 1995a
Botswana 1984, 1996
Burundi 1976, 1983, 1986, 1989,  1970a, 1972f, 1976a, 1986c, 1991c
1997Table 10A.2 (continued)
Currency Crises IMF Programs
Cameroon 1982, 1984, 1994 1980a, 1988a, 1991a, 1994a, 1995a, 1997d
Equatorial Guinea 1991, 1994 1980a, 1985a, 1988c, 1993c
Ethiopia 1992 1981a, 1992c, 1996d
Ghana 1978, 1983, 1986 1979a, 1983a, 1984a, 1986a, 1987bc, 1988c, 1995d
Guinea-Bissau 1991, 1996 1974f, 1982a, 1986a, 1987a, 1987c, 1991c, 1995c, 
1997d
Kenya 1975, 1981, 1985, 1993,  1975b, 1978a, 1979a, 1980a, 1982a, 1985a, 1988ac, 
1995, 1997 1989c, 1993c, 1996c
Madagascar 1984, 1986, 1991, 1994 1977a, 1980a, 1981a, 1982a, 1984a, 1985a, 1986a, 
1987c, 1988a, 1989c, 1996d
Malawi 1982, 1985, 1992, 1994 1979a, 1980a, 1982a, 1983b, 1988ac, 1994a, 1995cd
Mali 1993 1971a, 1982a, 1985a, 1988ac, 1992c, 1996d
Mauritius 1979 1978a, 1979a, 1980a, 1981a, 1983a
Morocco 1983, 1990 1971a, 1976f, 1980b, 1981b, 1982a, 1983a, 1985a, 
1988a, 1990a, 1992a
Mozambique 1993, 1995 1987c, 1990c, 1996d
Nigeria 1986, 1989, 1992 1987a, 1989a, 1991a
Zimbabwe 1982, 1991, 1994, 1997 1981a, 1983a, 1992bc
Sierra Leone 1988, 1990, 1997 1976f, 1977a, 1979a, 1981b, 1984a, 1986c, 1994c
Swaziland 1975, 1979, 1982, 1984
Tunisia 1993 1970a, 1986a, 1988b
Uganda 1981, 1987, 1989 1970a, 1976f, 1980a, 1981a, 1982a, 1983a, 1987c, 
1989c, 1994c, 1997d
Zambia 1985, 1994 1972f, 1973a, 1975f, 1976a, 1978a, 1981b, 1983a, 
1984a, 1986a, 1995c
Fiji 1986 1974a
Notes: Currency crises deﬁned by criteria described in text, with twenty-four-month exclusion win-
dows imposed. IMF programs speciﬁed below.
aStand By and Extended Stand By Agreements (SBA).
bExtended Fund Facility (EFF).
cStructural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF).
dPoverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).
eSupplemental Reserve Facility (SRF).







Change in current account–GDP ratio –0.258
(–0.94)
Change in budget surplus–real GDP ratio (t – 2) –0.678*
(–1.86)
Change in budget surplus–real GDP ratio (t – 1) 0.747**
(2.22)
Inﬂation (t – 1) 0.000
(0.96)
Real per capita GDP growth (t – 1) 0.001
(0.79)
Foreign exchange reserves to imports ratio (t – 1) –0.215***
(–3.97)
Real per capita GDP – level (t – 1) 0.000
(–0.35)
Real exchange rate overvaluation (t – 1) 0.000
(0.72)











% of observations correctly called 32
% of IMF programs correctly called 96
% of no program correctly called 17
Goodness-of-ﬁt (25% cutoff)
% of observations correctly called 71
% of IMF programs correctly called 34
% of no program correctly called 80
N 862
Log likelihood function –388.90
Signiﬁcance level 0.000
Note: Dependent variable: approval of short-term IMF programs.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.References
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Comment Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti
Identifying the eﬀects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs on
economic growth and on other macroeconomic variables is a diﬃcult task.
In this paper, the author follows the methodology ﬁrst laid out by Goldstein
and Montiel (1986) to examine whether IMF programs for stabilization
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Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti is in the European I department of the International Monetary
Fund.purposes have measurable eﬀects on economic performance. The novelty in
this study consists in the use of data on currency crises: the author asks
whether currency crises provide additional explanatory power to the basic
growth regressions used to identify the eﬀects of IMF programs, and
whether the presence of an IMF program during a currency crisis has a sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect on growth. The study focuses on emerging economies and ex-
cludes those less-developed countries that borrowed at concessional rates
under the structural adjustment facilities.
The paper is well written, and the basic inputs to the empirical analysis
are clearly presented to the reader. An appendix lists both the IMF pro-
grams the paper considers and the dates of the currency crises, and the for-
mal panel regression analysis is preceded by a careful examination of the
data. For example, the author documents the path of economic growth and
other variables such as inﬂation and the current account before and af-
ter IMF programs. The crucial diﬃculty in identifying the eﬀects of IMF
programs on economic variables is the standard selection bias problem:
Countries that borrow from the IMF typically do so because they face
balance-of-payments diﬃculties, and it is therefore likely that their overall
macroeconomic situation will be worse than the one faced by countries that
do not borrow from the IMF. Indeed, considering the list of countries in the
author’s sample that never borrowed from the IMF, we ﬁnd several of the
fastest-growing developing and emerging economies of the past three
decades: Botswana, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore.
My comments will mostly focus on the speciﬁcation of the model used by
the author and the policy implications that are drawn in section 10.6 and in
the conclusions.
What Eﬀ ects of Fund Programs Can the Model Identify?
As mentioned above, the model used by the author is standard in the lit-
erature. The Generalized Evaluation Estimator (GEE) addresses the selec-
tion bias problem by attempting to construct a counterfactual—that is, de-
termine how economic policy would have been conducted in the absence of
an IMF program—and to use this counterfactual to identify the actual im-
pact of IMF programs on economic growth. The basic equation is
(1) yit    i    kXit    hW it    IMFDit
IMF   εit
where Xitis a vector of economic policy variables in the absence of IMF pro-
grams. The counterfactual is constructed assuming that policies in the ab-
sence of an IMF program are set according to the policy reaction function
(2)  Xit    (yi
d   yi,t 1)    it.
Estimation is conducted substituting equation (2) into equation (1) without
actually proceeding to the estimation of the policy reaction function in
equation (2).
We also know from the literature that this approach has serious weak-
Output Costs of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs 355nesses, the primary one being the extremely poor explanatory power exhib-
ited by the postulated policy reaction functions when these are separately
estimated. In addition to this, the reader should also keep in mind what type
of eﬀects of IMF programs the above speciﬁcation can identify. As high-
lighted by Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni, and Schadler (2000), this speciﬁcation
can capture “direct” eﬀects of IMF programs on performance, related to
the availability of external funds to weather the balance-of-payments diﬃ-
culties, or the eﬀects of programs on conﬁdence (say, through their impact
on the risk premium). However, this speciﬁcation is not appropriate for cap-
turing the eﬀects of IMF programs on economic policy conduct (for ex-
ample, on monetary and ﬁscal policy) and through this channel on growth.
This can easily be seen by considering the following, more general speciﬁ-
cation of equation (1):
(3) yit    i    kX ˜
it    hW it    IMF Dit
IMF   εit
where the vector X ˜
it Xit Xit
IMFDit
IMFso that economic growth dependson
actual economic policy conduct X ˜
it and allowance is made for a systematic
diﬀerence in the conduct of economic policy in the presence of IMF pro-
grams. The estimation of the eﬀects of IMF programs in this case also re-
quires the use of the policy reaction function in equation (2) (which deter-
mines the value of policies in the absence of IMF programs when these are
not directly observable). However, in general the two formulations will not
be equivalent, unless it is assumed that the eﬀects of IMF programs on pol-
icy are constant across policy variables. This must be kept in mind when one
examines whether economic policy is systematically diﬀerent during IMF
programs, as the author does in section 10.5.
Policy Reaction Functions
In section 10.5, the author proceeds to the actual estimation of policy re-
action functions for the policy variables included in the regression in equa-
tion (1). Only the results of the credit growth regressions are reported, be-
cause the explanatory power of the other policy reaction function is very
limited.
In these regressions, the author shows that policy under IMF programs
appears to be systematically diﬀerent from policy in the absence of pro-
grams, with credit growth being lower. This ﬁnding seems reasonable, con-
sidering the typical design of IMF programs. However, inferring from this
ﬁnding that the negative eﬀects of IMF programs on growth identiﬁed us-
ing the GEE could work through a negative impact on growth of tight credit
policy is problematic for two reasons. First, as mentioned above, the for-
mulation used by the author in the GEE regressions is not appropriate for
capturing the eﬀects on growth of diﬀerent policies under IMF programs.
Second, and most important, the regressions show a systematic negative
356 Michael M. Hutchisoneﬀect of credit growth on output growth, and therefore they do not seem to
identify any negative eﬀect of “tight credit” on economic performance.
Interestingly, in the estimation of the credit policy reaction function for
nonprogram years there appears to be a signiﬁcant eﬀect of selection bias:
the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is statistically very signiﬁcant. This suggests
that selection bias may indeed be a problem also in the estimation of the
growth regressions, but the author does not ﬁnd there any signiﬁcant im-
pact of the IMR.
The Choice of Variables
In general the author uses a fairly standard speciﬁcation for growth re-
gressions. I am only unclear about the use of the change in the budget bal-
ance in the growth regressions and the use of the lagged change in the cur-
rent account as an explanatory variable for credit growth. In both cases the
level of the underlying variable would seem to be a much more logical
choice.
Other Issues
I am also concerned that some of the author’s results concerning the im-
pact of inﬂation on growth as well as diﬀerences in inﬂation between pro-
gram and nonprogram years may be contaminated by the presence of a few
countries that suﬀered bouts of hyperinﬂation: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Nicaragua, and Peru. Also, while in the regressions it is perfectly reasonable
to use a log-diﬀerence speciﬁcation for inﬂation, this is less appropriate for
the comparison of program and nonprogram years, given that for relatively
high rates of inﬂation the log diﬀerence is a poor approximation of the ac-
tual inﬂation rate.
Although I concur with the construction of the currency crises index,
which takes into account variations in the real rather than the nominal ex-
change rate (thus correcting for the presence of high inﬂation, high depre-
ciation episodes) I am surprised that the methodology does not detect a cur-
rency crisis in Chile in 1982, a year of high real depreciation and substantial
reserve losses.
In summary, the author has made a valuable eﬀort in his attempt to iden-
tify the degree to which IMF programs and currency crises aﬀect economic
performance. The shortcomings of the paper are those of the overall
methodology being used.
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Discussion Summary
Martin Feldstein questioned the treatment of the endogeneity problem for
IMF programs. He remarked that it is not clear whether the insigniﬁcance
of the IMR coeﬃcient means there is no selection bias (participation is ran-
dom) or the process does not account for it and estimation is still biased.
Also, he questioned whether the fact that the IMF provides a “good house-
keeping” seal of approval is accounted for in the empirical work.
Morris Goldstein mentioned an interdependence problem. Even if
Malaysia does not want an IMF program, it might still adopt IMF policy
recommendations in order to get acceptance by international markets.
Thus, the IMF had an eﬀect on Malaysia even though it did not implement
a program there.
Kenneth D. West noted that the insigniﬁcance of the IMR term is also
pervasive in labor studies.
William Easterly remarked that there is a very high rate of repetition in
IMF programs. Some countries go to the IMF repeatedly for many years,
which suggests the IMF is not successful in whatever it is trying to do.
Nouriel Roubini suggested using a variable that proxies for the currency
mismatch in the balance sheet (net foreign debt times the amount of deval-
uation).
Michael P. Dooley remarked that domestic credit is a variable that is very
closely watched by the IMF staﬀ and that the IMF always negotiates for
contractionary credit policy. This could be the only thing that diﬀerentiates
program countries. This, he noted, corresponds to the paper’s ﬁndings.
Martin Eichenbaum asked what the IMF is trying to do. If it is trying to
build reserves, then it is successful. As for structural change, he doubted
that the IMF actually manages to achieve much, considering the institu-
tional and cultural character of these reforms.
Michael Hutchison responded that dealing with self-selection bias ap-
peared to be very diﬃcult. It hinges on developing a stable policy reaction
function over time and space. Handling currency crises up front was an at-
tempt to control better for policy responses. In response to Feldstein’s
comment, he commented that an attempt to split the sample to examine
whether the 1975–90 period was diﬀerent from what followed was made but
that no signiﬁcant structural break was detected. In response to Goldstein’s
comment, Hutchison stated that if Malaysia took the same policy measures
then the question remains whether the contribution of the IMF loan facil-
358 Michael M. Hutchisonity for the other East Asian countries helped with a faster recovery. Also, he
noted that his participation equation, as is shown in the appendix, is not
very good. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to know whether the insigniﬁcance of the
IMR is because a stable participation equation was not identiﬁed or that it
does not exist and participation is random.
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